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Unanimity as a Rule For Group Consensus: A 
Review of the Theoretical and Experimental 
Literature on the Use of Unanimity in Group 
Decision-making 
Kevin C. Ruminson 
Urhittier College 
This literature review examines the use of unanimity as a rule for reaching group concensus in decision making The 
review contains a brief overview of gmup decision making and of the processes involved in reaching unanimous 
decision rule on various group processes and the positive and negative aspects of using this method to reach 
decisions. From the experimental literature, it appears that unanimous decision vile increases group cohesiveness 
and commitment to the decision, but at a loss of decision quality: Therefore, the group priorities should be taken into 
account when considering unanimity as a decision rule. 
Group decision making is an 
important topic in today's dialogue on 
organizational behavior. 	 In recent 
years there has been a lot of talk about 
work groups and group decision 
making. The increased use of work 
groups is a result of attempts to 
empower employees and get them 
more involved in the organizations that 
they work for. Popular management 
theory currently stresses the idea that 
increased involvement and control over 
one's job can increase job satisfaction 
and creativity. 
However, work groups are not the 
only important decision making bodies 
in organizations, group decision 
making takes place at all levels. Most 
organizations are controlled by groups 
rather than individuals, and these 
groups must make decisions that will 
affect the organization more than the 
decisions made by work groups. 
Group decisions making may take place 
in institutionalized settings, such as (a) 
juries, (b) corporate boards, (c) 
departmental executive committees, 
and (d) congressional committees. 
Group decisions may also be made in 
ad hoc committees, such as study 
panels or academic conferences (Davis, 
1973). Research on group decision 
making at all levels of organizations, as 
well as in experimental settings, is 
important to gaining as understanding 
of how to best structure the decision 
making of groups. 
Group Decision Making 
Theoretically, there are several 
reasons why group decision making is 
superior to individual decision making. 
The first benefit that can be obtained by 
group decision making is the increased 
knowledge and information that can be 
utilized in the decision process. This is 
known as a pooling of resources. 
Making decisions in groups allows a 
specialization of labor. Members of the 
group can concentrate on the tasks for 
which they are best suited. Decisions 
made by groups are likely to be 
accepted more readily than decisions 
made by individuals (Greenberg and 
Baron, 1995). 	 This may be true 
because people have a greater trust in a 
collective decision involving the 
checks-and-balances of group members 
rather 	 than 	 the 	 dictatorial 
pronouncements of a single individual. 
While group decisions can be 
theoretically argued to be superior to 
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individual decisions, the research on 
group decision making has led to mixed 
results. Stasson, Ono, Zimmerman and 
Davis (1991) found that groups 
sometimes made higher quality 
decisions than individuals and 
sometimes made lower quality 
decisions. It appears that many factors 
affect whether individuals or groups 
will make better decisions on a task. 
However, group decision making 
continues to be most commonly used. 
Before decisions can be made by 
groups, the group must have a decision 
rule in place. The selection of a 
decision rule clarifies how the decision 
will be made. There are essentially two 
types of rules that may be used. These 
are non-participatory decision rules and 
participatory rules. Non-participatory 
decision rules are authoritarian decision 
rules that specify a particular member 
of the gaup as having the power to 
make decision for the group. Examples 
of this are rules based on (a) 
dictatorship, (b) authority or (c) 
seniority. 
On the other hand, participatory 
decision rules place more emphasis on 
egalitarianism. One example of this 
majority rule, in which each member 
has a vote, and the alternative that gets 
the most votes becomes the group 
decision. 	 Another example of a 
participatory decision rule is unanimity. 
Under this decision rule, all members of 
the group must agree on the alternative 
that is chosen as the group decision 
(Nielson and Miller, 1992). 
Group Consensus 
Although the words unanimity and 
consensus may seem redundant, this is 
actually not the case. Consensus is 
usually taken to mean an unanimous  
group decision. 	 However, in the 
experimental literature, the gaup 
decision is often referred to as a 
consensus as long as a participatory 
decision rule was used. Therefore, a 
decision made by majority vote can be 
described as group cons4ensus just as 
much as an unanimous decision can be 
described as group consensus. 
According to Jefferson (1995), 
consensus is often used interchangeably 
with agreement and "simply means that 
most people in the decision situation 
agreed on the outcome" (p.1). 
Unanimity can be described as a 
decision reached by the agreement of 
every group member. When this type 
of decision rule is used, any individual 
within the group has the ability to veto 
a decision (Laing and Slotznick, 1991). 
Therefore, there is no majority-minority 
split. All members must either agree to 
the decision or, depending on what 
type of consensus is used, abstain from 
being part of the decision. Unanimity 
is used in an attempt to ensure that 
each member approves of the decision 
and is able to freely commit to the 
course of action chosen by the group 
(Schwarz, 1994). In some situations 
when unanimous decision rule is used, 
there is some course of action known 
as the "status quo" that will take place 
unless the group can come to a 
unanimous decision (Miller and 
Anderson, 1979). Therefore, a veto of 
the group by a minority may still result 
in action rather than a stalemate. 
Although no official vote is taken with 
unanimity. A "straw poll" is often used 
to enable members to express their 
preference and get an idea of how close 
the group is top a unanimous 
agreement (Davis et al., 1993). 
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Unanimity 
In organizations, unanimous 
decision rules tend to be used mostly 
for important decisions. 	 This is 
because the process of building 
consensus and agreement is very time 
consuming. Because everyone in the 
group has to be persuaded to make the 
same specific decision, this process 
involves much discussion and 
persuasion. If an organization used this 
method for all its decisions, it would 
slow down the decision making process 
immensely. It is not necessary to use a 
unanimous decision rule to decide on 
the color of the new carpet in the 
office. However, deciding whether or 
not to form a joint venture or merger 
with another corporation would 
probably benefit from the use of this 
decision rule. 
Unanimous decision rule works best 
when those in the group feel a unity of 
purpose, have equal power and are 
willing to conscientiously use the 
decision rule. Furthermore, unanimity 
works when the group is able to 
operate independently of external 
hierarchical structures such as 
departments and divisions and has 
adequate time to reach a unanimous 
decision (Jefferson, 1994). 
When individuals meet as a 
group to make a decision, the 
individuals in the group often have 
different preferences as to what 
decision will be made. During the 
course of discussion, these preferences 
may change. With a majority decision 
rule, a change in preference is not 
necessary by the minority, because a 
majority vote decides the course of 
action. With a unanimous decision 
rule, individuals in the minority must 
either change their preferences or else 
conform to the majority. 
Group consensus can be viewed "as 
a social psychological process 
influenced by factors such as 
communication patterns, norms, 
polarization or conformity" (Lim, 
1994, p. 439). There are several ways 
that groups can reach a unanimous 
decision. One of these is by random 
process, in which members gradually 
change their opinions over time until 
the group holds a unanimous opinion. 
Another way of reaching a unanimous 
decision is by mutual attraction. 
Mutual attraction involves processes in 
which a group member defends or 
advocates a specific position during 
group discussion. This increases the 
chance that others will shift their 
preferences to his or her position. 
Those who forcefully advocate their 
position attract others to their positions 
and help create group consensus 
(Coleman as cited in Godwin and 
Restle, 1974). 
There are several other issues that 
are important to the process by which 
unanimity is achieved. These include 
issues about (a) minority and majority 
influence, (b) conformity and (c) 
psychological obstacles to dispute 
resolution. 
Majority And Minority Influence 
While research has been done on 
how the majority influences the 
minority in a group, there has also been 
some research on how the minority and 
influences the majority. Both these 
processes would take place in a group 
governed by unanimous decision rule 
since either the majority must change 
to the minority position, the minority 
must shift to the majority position, or 
some alternative must be agreed upon. 
One 	 interesting 	 issue 	 in 
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minority/majority influence is favorable 
attitudes to positions presented by the 
minority to the majority. Baker and 
Petty (19944)) found that the use of 
strong arguments by majorities resulted 
in more favorable attitudes toward their 
proposal than the use of weak 
arguments. The quality of arguments 
made by minorities did not affect 
attitudes. 	 It appears that more 
credibility is given to the majority 
presentations 
	
than 	 minority 
presentations. 
However, research by Latane and 
Wolf (1981) points out that just 
because a group is a minority does not 
mean that it has less power than the 
majority. While majorities have the 
advantage of size, position and power, 
a minority can place the majority at a 
disadvantage if the minority is very 
confident about and committed to its 
position. Similarly, Moscovici 
describes a model in which the 
minority, in order to influence the 
majority: 
Must initially induce a onflict 
with the majority bychallenging 
the 	 majority 
	
norm; 
consequently it has toprovide a 
consistent and stable alternative 
norm. Both goals are achieved 
by showing a behavioral style 
that indicates certainty and 
commitment (as cited in Maass 
and Clark, 1984 p.428) 
While minority influence 
appears to be the result of commitment 
and persuasion, majority influence is 
often the result of a comparison 
process. In this process those in the 
minority compare their preferences to 
the majority's preference. Because of 
the need for unanimity, those in the 
minority may publicly change their  
preference in a process known as 
compliance, while privately holding 
their own original view. 	 Thus, 
unanimity may be "derived from a 
need for consensus and not from a 
change in understanding of the issue 
under discussion" (Wood et al., 1994 
p.324). 
Other processes may also be 
involved in reconciling majority and 
minority preferences. For example, the 
majority and minority may reach a 
compromise or may use methods like 
logrolling. 	 Logrolling occurs in 
situations in which the majority and 
minority preferences are highly 
discrepant and the majority moves 
towards the minority position under the 
expectation that the minority will move 
toward the majority position (Kerr, 
1992). 
Conformity 
Many times unanimous 
decisions are made by persuading 
group members to choose an option by 
education, debate and presentation of 
information. It is likely that there will 
be times that the minority members will 
merely conform to the preferences of 
the majority in order to reach a 
unanimous decision. Conformity is 
different from compliance because it is 
based on social pressures from the 
group rather than a need for consensus. 
Although the minority member has the 
power of veto, they may choose not to 
exercise this power because of implicit 
or explicit pressure from the majority, 
even if the minority member is 
convinced that the majority is moving 
in the wrong direction. 
In his classic research on 
conformity, Asch (1956) found that 
conformity to the majority occurred 
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quite often, even when the majority 
was obviously wrong. In this study, 
subjects were presented with one 
display consisting of one line and then 
were presented with another display 
consisting of three lines. They were 
then asked which of the three lines 
matched the first line. Subjects were 
placed in a group of experimental 
confederates who all picked the same 
wrong line. A significant number of 
the subjects conformed to the minority 
position and also chose the obviously 
wrong alternative. 	 If conformity 
happens this commonly on an easily 
verifiable task such as matching 
physical objects, it seems likely that the 
pressure to conform to the majority 
would be even stronger in situations 
involving much less easily verifiable 
tasks such as juries or strategic 
decisions. 
Psychological Obstacles 
When members of groups have 
different preferences on the alternative 
to be chosen, they have psychological 
barriers that must be overcome if they 
are to change their preference in the 
process of reaching a unanimous 
decision. These psychological barriers 
are the result of the cognitive and 
motivational processes that govern "the 
way that human beings interpret 
information, evaluate risks, set 
priorities and experience feelings of 
gain or loss" (Ross and Ward, 1995 
p.263). 
One such psychological 
obstacle is the perceptions individual 
members have of support for their 
positions as being higher than it 
actually is(Marks and Miler, 1987). 
Research by Miller (1993) found that 
minorities tend to overestimate support  
for their position while majorities 
underestimate support. Research by 
Mullen and Smith (1989) found that a 
minority's estimated support for their 
decision to be at higher levels as the 
actual support decreased. Majorities 
tended to increasingly underestimate 
the support for their position as the 
actual level of support increased. 
Miller (1993) argues that this 
"tendency to perceive consensus could 
make it difficult to achieve real 
consensus" (p.390). 
One possible effect of the false 
consensus bias is that it could give 
minorities more power by motivating 
them "to press their points; provide fuel 
for their arguments about why they 
should prevail, and in general place 
them in a stronger position than would 
otherwise be the case" (Miller, 1993 
p.390). The false consensus affect may 
particularly come into play in groups 
ruled by an unanimous decision rule in 
which the issue is debated until the 
group can come to a unanimous 
decision. False perceptions of support 
may motivate minorities to hold on to 
their viewpoint longer. The longer 
those in the minority hold their 
position, the more the chances they 
have to change other members' 
opinions. 
Group Interaction 
Much of the research on 
unanimity has focused on the effects of 
using this decision rule on the 
interaction and performance of the 
group. Research has focused on 
several different areas including (a) 
preferences shift and satisfaction, (b) 
ability to reach unanimous decisions, (c) 
problem solving and learning, (d) 
selection of group members and (e) 
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comparative performance with other 
decision rules. 
Kaplan and Miller (1987) 
performed a study on normative versus 
informational influence in relation to 
type of issue and assigned decision 
rule. The purpose of this research was 
to examine shifts in preferences 
following discussion and the process 
involved in these shifts. Their subjects 
were 240 female undergraduate 
students enrolled in an introductory 
psychology course. 	 Subjects were 
assigned to groups of six whose task 
was to come to an agreement on a 
damage award for a civil case. Half of 
the aroups were assigned an unanimous 
decision rule and half of them were 
assigned a majority decision rule. 
Groups were given either intellective 
issues, which are issues that have 
verifiably correct answers or 
judgmental issues, "which involve 
behavioral, ethical or esthetic 
judgments for which there are no 
demonstrably correct answers" (Kaplan 
and Miller, 1987 p.307). 
This study found two effects 
that are relevant to this literature 
review. Kaplan and Miller (1987) 
found that the largest shift in 
preference occurred in groups using the 
unanimity rule on judgmental issues. 
These are issues, such as ethic 
judgments on which there is no correct 
answer that can be easily verified. 
Subjects were least satisfied with 
decisions made on judgmental issues 
under majority rule. In other words, 
the use of unanimous decision rule 
increased satisfaction with decisions 
made on issues with no verifiably 
correct answers. 
Reaching Unanimous Decisions 
Kerr (1992) studied the effects 
of issue importance on the ability to 
reach unanimous decisions. He placed 
236 undergraduate students in 15 
person decision groups. Groups were 
given a set amount of time to discuss 
the problems of varying importance and 
then instructed to come to an 
agreement. If an agreement could not 
be reached, the decision was recorded 
as NO GROUP DECISION. Kerr 
(1992) found that it was more difficult 
for groups to reach unanimous 
decisions on important issues than on 
unimportant issues. While unanimous 
decision rule is best used for important 
decisions, these are the hardest 
decisions to reach a unanimous 
agreement on. 
Effects Of Unanimous Decision 
Stasson, et al. (1991) placed 
introductory psychology students into 
either an individual mathematical 
problem solving situation or into five-
person groups assigned to work on sets 
of mathematical problems. The general 
hypothesis in this experiment was that 
assigned decision rules would affect 
group problem-solving performance 
and group-to-individual problem-
solving transfer. The experimenters 
manipulated the assigned decision rule 
by giving groups either a no consensus, 
majority or unanimity decision rule. 
The researchers measured learning in 
(a) and individual pretest, (b) a group 
test and (c)an individual posttest. 
The dependent variable in this 
experiment was mean pertbrmance 
measured by the number of correct 
responses on the mathematical 
problems. The experimenters found 
that majority-rule groups experienced 
higher levels of group-to-individual 
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and individual pretest, (b) a group test 
and (c)an individual posttest. 
The dependent variable in this 
experiment was mean performance 
measured by the number of correct 
responses on the mathematical 
problems. The experimenters found 
that majority-rule groups experienced 
higher levels of group-to-individual 
transfer. 	 In situations where "no 
member was correct at the outset of 
discussion, truth emerged more often 
in the unanimity condition than in the 
majority condition" (Stasson et al., 
1991 p.33). 	 The experimenters 
suggested that groups should use 
unanimous decision rules in situations 
in which group-level performance is 
important should use majority decision 
rules when group-to individual transfer 
is also important. 
One interesting issue related to 
groups is the selection of new 
members. Platt (1992) hypothesized 
that groups using unanimous decision 
rule to select members would create a 
more homogenous group than groups 
using majority decision rule. Platt 
placed M.B.A. students in groups of 
three and assigned them different 
decision rules for selecting new 
students to be admitted to the school. 
Unanimous decision rule resulted in a 
more homogeneous group of admitted 
students than did majority rule. Platt 
(1992) suggested that these might be 
generalizable to other situations, such 
as a corporate board of directors. A 
board of directors using unanimity 
might better reach organizational goals 
by maintaining narrow and consistent 
policies but may also discourage 
innovation. 
This tendency of groups to 
select new members that have similar  
characteristics to those already in the 
group, raises some interesting issues. 
Groups tend to make better decisions 
when they are heterogeneous, 
composed of members from a wide 
variety of specialization, possess 
complimentary skills and that bring a 
wide variety of opinions to the group 
(Greenberg and Baron, 1995). The 
selection of new members by 
individuals in the group may actually 
lead to poorer performance. It can be 
speculated that it would be 
advantageous to have someone outside 
the group determine group 
composition in order to ensure that the 
group was heterogeneous. The type of 
decision rule used should be carefully 
chosen when groups are selecting new 
members. 
Research by Miller and 
Anderson (1979) examined the effects 
of group decision rules on the rejection 
of deviates. This study examined the 
effects of majority rule, dictatorship 
rule and unanimity rule on the 
rejection of deviates. The subjects 
were 256 women enrolled in an 
introductory psychology course. These 
subjects were divided into five-person 
groups that included four naïve 
subjects and one experimental 
confederate. Groups were assigned 
one of the three decision rules, were 
given the case study of a youthful 
offender and were asked to determine 
whether this offender should be 
confined to a state institution. The 
results showed that the assigned 
decision rule did not matter when the 
deviate was not able to impose their 
will on the group. However when the 
deviate was able to force their 
preference on the group, the deviate 
was strongly rejected by the group and 
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the decision was seen as unfair and 
unrepresentative. 
When an individual in the 
minority exercises their veto right on 
the group and causes a non 
representative decision to be made, the 
individual may be strongly rejected by 
the group. This may pose problems in 
a situation in which the group will 
have to work together on future 
problems. Exercising the right to veto 
a decision may lead to damaged 
relationships that may affect future 
group decision processes. 
Miller (1985) used 240 male 
college students enrolled in an 
introductory psychology course as 
subjects for a study on group decision 
making under majority and unanimity 
rules. He hypothesized that assigned 
decision rule information on 
preferences would affect the decisions 
made. Subjects were divided into 
three-person groups and the groups 
were given either a majority or 
unanimity decision rule. The groups 
had to choose between a set of 
alternatives laid out on a continuum. 
Rewards were given in such a way that 
each group member preferred a 
different alternative. In each study, 
one subject was assigned (a) a left 
position, (b) one "center" position and 
(c)one right position on the continuum. 
The center position was 
actually slightly to the left of the 
center. The subjects were awarded 
larger payoffs when the group selected 
their preferred alternative or an 
alternative near their preferred one. 
Miller (1985) found that under 
unanimous decision rule, alternatives 
closer to the most extreme member, 
the right position, were chosen more 
than under majority rule. The results  
also indicated that the use of the 
different decision rules led to different 
decisions when members knew each 
others preference, but this did not 
affect the decision when they were not 
given this information. 
The information that group 
members have about the preferences of 
other members may affect what 
decision is chosen. 	 Miller (1985) 
concluded that this research was 
important because it indicated that in 
situations in which groups must choose 
among alternatives on a continuum. 
The type of decision rule may result in 
different decisions. 	 Miller (1985) 
suggested that the differing results 
between decision rules were the result 
of "splitting the difference" between 
the two positions closest to each other 
in the majority rule and the two 
extreme positions in the unanimity 
rule. After all, in the unanimity rule 
groups, the individual whose position 
is farthest from the other two will be 
able to veto a splitting of the 
difference between these two closer 
members. However, in the majority 
rule groups, the extreme member does 
not have this option. 
In a study by Schweiger, 
Sandberg and Ragan (1986) 120 
M.B.A. students from a course in 
corporate strategy and policy were 
involved in comparison of (a) 
dialectical inquiry, (b) devil's 
advocacy and (c) consensus decision 
rules. Dialectical inquiry and devil's 
advocacy are rules based on conflict 
rather than on agreement. In the 
devil's advocacy decision aid, one 
member in the group sets forward a 
plan and then another member of the 
group is designated as the devil's 
advocate who criticizes the plan in 
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attempt to point out any faults and 
reasons why the plan should not be 
implemented. 
The dialectical inquiry decision 
rule involves proposing a plan and 
identifying the facts that support the 
plan. 	 Next, the underlying 
assumptions are identified and a 
counterplan is developed. 	 This 
counterplan is based on assumptions 
that are opposite to those that underlie 
the original plan. Finally, a structured, 
forceful presentation and debate of the 
two plans takes place (Schwenk and 
Valacich, 1994). 
Subjects were assigned to four-
person groups and the groups were 
assigned either a dialectical inquiry, 
devil's advocacy or consensus 
condition. The groups were asked to 
analyze a case study of a drug 
company 	 and 	 to 	 make 
recommendations based on the case 
study. 	 Scweiger, et al., (1986) 
hypothesized that the assigned decision 
rule would affect (a) group 
performance, (b) group member's 
satisfaction, (c) critical evaluation, (d) 
acceptance of the decision and (e) 
confidence in decision. The results 
indicated that the consensus decision 
rule was inferior to the conflict-based 
decision aids on the quality of 
assumptions and recommendations 
made by the groups. However, groups 
using the consensus decision rule 
expressed greater acceptance of 
decisions, satisfaction with groups and 
the desire to work together in the 
future than groups using the other 
decision rules. 	 This suggests that 
conflict-based decision making may 
result in better decision-making, but at 
a cost to group harmony. 
In a study similar to the earlier 
research by Miller and Anderson 
(1979), Miller et al., (1987) examined 
some of the social psychological 
effects of different group decision 
rules. They used 296 male students 
from an introductory psychology class 
for this study. Subjects were divided 
into five-person groups with one 
member deviating from the majority 
opinion. Groups were assigned either 
a majority, dictatorial or unanimity 
decision rule. 
The group task was to read a 
case study and decision whether a 
youthful offender should be confined 
to a state institution. The researchers 
hypothesized that the assigned decision 
rule would affect satisfaction with 
decisions, perceived fairness of rules 
and rejection between the majority and 
deviates. The results indicated that 
agreement with the decision and 
feelings that the decision was 
representative of the group affected 
satisfaction and perceived fairness of 
decision rule. The actual decision 
reached can affect the way individuals 
think 	 the 	 decision 	 was 
unrepresentative of the group or if they 
disagree with the decision. 
This finding is probably 
because the deviate in the latter two 
decision rules is able to impose their 
preference on the group. The results 
also indicated that there was a higher 
degree of rejection of deviates if the 
deviates were able to impose an 
unrepresentative decision on the group. 
Schweiger et al. (1989) used 
120 middle and upper middle level 
managers from a Fortune 500 company 
in a study of the effects of assigned 
decision rule on group performance, 
group members' reactions, meeting 
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time and experience. Subjects were 
assigned to four-person groups and 
were presented case studies that posed 
several strategic problems in two 
different session. 	 Groups were 
assigned either (a) dialectical inquiry, 
(b) devil's advocacy or (c)consensus as 
a decision rule. They were required to 
analyze the case study and present 
recommendations, supporting facts and 
assumptions chosen by their group's 
decisions rule. 
Schweiger et al. (1989) found 
that experience improved performance 
significantly, even though the case 
presented in the second section was 
more complex and difficult than the 
first one. They also found that the use 
of conflict-based decision aids, 
dialectical inquiry and devil's 
advocacy, resulted in higher 
performance than groups using the 
unanimous decision rule. Members in 
the groups that used conflict-based 
decision rules reported that they 
reevaluated their recommendations 
and assumptions to a greater extent 
than did those in groups using the 
agreement-based decision rule. The 
conflict-based decision aids resulted in 
longer meeting time than consensus 
decision rule, although this effect was 
only significant in the first session. 
Unlike earlier research, this 
study found that there was no 
significant differences in satisfaction 
among the three decisions aids, and 
satisfaction increased significantly 
between the first and second sessions. 
Decisions made by the consensus 
groups resulted in a higher degree of 
acceptance than decisions made by the 
conflict-based groups. This difference 
was only significant in the first 
session, which suggests that  
experience with a decision rule 
increases acceptance of decisions 
made by that rule. One of the major 
strengths of this study compared to 
many of the other studies done on 
unanimous decision rule was that it 
was conducted on a sample of 
managers rather than students. 
Schwenk and Cosier (1993) 
hypothesized that groups assigned a 
conflict-based decision making 
technique would make higher quality 
decisions and have a higher degree of 
critical evaluation. 	 They also 
hypothesized that these groups would 
have less commitment to the group's 
decisions and would have-less interest 
on working together in the future than 
groups given a consensus-based 
decision aid or groups given no 
decision aid. 
The subjects were 152 students 
who were placed in groups and 
assigned to either (a) a devil's 
advocate decision aid, a conflict-based 
decision technique, (b) an agreement 
decision aid, which avoided techniques 
like majority voting or (c)no decision 
aid, in which groups were not given 
instructions on how to conduct their 
analysis. 	 The agreement based 
decision aid was comparable to 
unanimous decision rule. Schwenk 
and Cosier (1993) found that their 
hypotheses were partially supported. 
The results indicated that the groups 
given the conflict-based decision aid 
had a greater degree of critical 
evaluation but did not produce 
decisions of a significantly higher 
quality than groups given the 
agreement-based rule or no decision 
rule. The results were also mixed on 
the issues of commitment and 
willingness to work together. Those 
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given an agreement-based decision 
rule expressed a greater willingness to 
work together than those given a 
conflict-based decision aid. However, 
the conflict- based decision aid did not 
decrease expressions of commitment 
to the decision as was hypothesized. 
Negative Aspects 
Although the use of unanimity 
may result in several positive effects, 
there are also some definite problems 
involved in the use of this decision 
rule. There are two particular traps 
that groups governed by unanimous 
decision rule need to consider. These 
are group-think and entrapment. 
One of the most dangerous problems 
that can surface during group decision 
making is groupthink. Groupthink can 
be defined as "a mode of thinking that 
persons engage in when concurrence-
seeking becomes so dominant in a 
cohesive in-group that it tends to 
override realistic appraisal of 
alternative courses of action" (Janis, 
1971 p. 43). Group members "become 
more concerned about maintaining 
positive group spirit tan about making 
the most realistic decisions" 
(Greenberg and Baron, 1995 p.396). 
The concept of groupthink was 
developed by Janis through his 
analysis of decision making fiascoes 
such as the Bay of Pigs and the 
escalation in Vietnam. 
There are several symptoms 
that indicate the presence of 
groupthink. These include (a) an 
illusion of invulnerability by those in 
the 	 group, 	 (b) 	 collective 
rationalization, (c) unquestioned 
feelings of moral superiority and (d) 
excessive negative stereotyping of 
those outside the group. Symptoms  
also include (a) strong internal 
pressure to conform, (b) self-
censorship of dissenting ideas, (c) an 
illusion of unanimity and (d) self 
appointed mind guard who protect the 
group from negative or threatening 
information (Greenberg and Baron, 
1995). 
When groupthink occurs in 
gourd decision making, several 
processes may inhibit decision making 
quality. According to Janis (1971) 
group processes resulting from 
groupthink include only discussing a 
small number of alternative and failing 
to reexamine the majority preference 
after learning of risks or drawbacks. 
Groups avoid discussion of ways to 
make rejected alternative more 
appealing and may make no effort to 
consult experts on the subject of the 
decision. Other processes resulting 
from groupthink include ignoring facts 
and opinions that do not support the 
preferred alternative and spending 
little time discussing the pitfalls that 
may hinder the implementation of the 
decision. Janis (1971) argued that 
these group processes result in poor 
decision making and were often 
involved in decision making fiascoes. 
Although groups governed by 
all kinds of decision rules may fall 
victim to groupthink, it seems likely 
that groups governed by unanimous 
decision rule would be particularly at 
risk. Since the use of unanimous 
decision rule tends to foster group 
cohesiveness, these groups are 
particularly vulnerable to groupthink. 
According to Janis (1971), group 
cohesiveness is one of the 
characteristics that may lead to 
groupthink. The unanimity requires 
that conflict be eventually put aside so 
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a common decision may be reached. 
This process may involve strong 
internal pressures to conform, which is 
also a symptom of groupthink. If 
group members are pressured into a 
course of action they are not 
necessarily comfortable with, an 
illusion of unanimity may occur which 
is a further symptom of goupthink. 
Since the model proposed by Janis 
(1971) argues that groups that fall 
victim to groupthink tend to make poor 
quality decisions, groups governed by 
unanimity should be especially 
sensitive to signs of groupthink. 
Several methods have been proposed 
to combat groupthink in decision 
making groups. 	 These include 
promoting open inquiry within the 
group, using subgroups, admitting 
shortcomings, and holding second-
chance meetings (Greenberg and 
Baron, 1995). 
This concept of groputhink is 
intuitively appealing and seems to 
provide a good explanation for 
decision making fiascoes. Aldag and 
Fuller (1993) question the validity of 
this model of decision making fiascoes 
for several reasons. They argue that 
this model has questionable validity 
for several reasons. It has been widely 
generalized even though it was based 
on a small restricted sample and has 
not received consistent empirical 
support (Aldag and Fuller, 1993). One 
of the main criticisms of the 
groupthink model is that most of its 
support "has come from retrospective 
case studies that have focused on 
decision fiascoes rather than 
comparing the decision-making 
processes associated with good and 
bad decisions" (Aldag and Fuller, 
1993, 538). Janis' theory is widely  
accepted even though he focused only 
on decision failures and he did not 
include research on successful decision 
making that may have occurred under 
the same symptoms and conditions. 
Similar to the idea of 
groupthink is the concept of 
entrapment studied by Kameda and 
Sugimori (1993). While groupthink 
usually refers to defective decision 
making processes, entrapment involves 
increasing the commitment to a 
previous decision in order to justify the 
investments resulting from that 
decision. 
In order to test the effects of 
decision rules on group - entrapment, 
Kameda and Sugimori (1993) 
conducted an experiment in which 
undergraduate students made a series 
of related decisions under majority or 
unanimity decision rules. Subjects 
were randomly assigned to a group 
governed either by majority or 
unanimity decision rule. The students 
were given a situation in which they 
made an initial choice about a course 
of action from several alternatives. 
They were then given feedback about 
the outcomes of their decision and 
were required periodically to decide 
whether to proceed with the initial 
course of action, or to choose a 
different alternative from the initial 
choices. Entrapment was measured by 
the length of time that the groups kept 
the initial course of action in the face 
of negative outcomes. 
Kameda and Sugimori (1993) 
found that groups governed by 
unanimous decision rule were 
entrapped more than groups governed 
by majority rule. One explanation for 
this was that in groups governed by 
majority rule, those whose preferred 
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initial alternative was not chosen 
would be more likely to advocate a 
decision to change to a different 
alternative when faced with negative 
outcomes. Those in the unanimous 
decision rule group had to be 
convinced of the correctness of the 
initial choice instead of being merely 
outvoted. As a result, they had more 
psychological stake in the decision 
than those governed by majority rule. 
They would be more committed to the 
original decision, and less open to 
believing they had made an incorrect 
choice. 
Like groupthink, it appears that 
entrapment is a condition that groups 
governed by unanimous decision rules 
are particularly vulnerable to. 
Therefore, it is important for such 
groups to be aware of these potential 
traps and take steps to combat the 
problems associated with them. 
Conclusions 
Overall, the research presents a 
mixed view of the effectiveness of 
unanimous decision rule. Decisions 
made by unanimity take more time and 
effort to make, but group members 
become more committed to the 
decision, reach a greater understanding 
of the decision, and are more likely to 
support the decision (Gitman and 
McDaniel, 1995). While unanimous 
decision rule appears to result in 
greater satisfaction with decisions, 
greater acceptance of decisions, and 
greater interest of members to work 
with the group again, other decision 
aids appear to result in better decision 
quality and critical evaluation. It also 
appears that groups governed by 
unanimous decision rules would be 
particularly prone to groupthink and  
entrapment. 
	 The priorities of a 
decision making group need to be 
taken into account when a decision 
rule is selected. 	 If the group is 
interested in decision quality over 
cohesiveness, unanimous decision rule 
should not be used. If the group is 
interested more in cohesiveness than 
decision quality, unanimity could be a 
valuable decision rule. 
While much important research 
has been done on unanimity, the 
generalizability of almost all the 
experiments can be questioned. Much 
of the research used student subjects 
who were brought together for one 
session of decision making tasks. In 
contrast, most decision-making groups 
in the real world are together for a 
much longer time, the members know 
each other better, and the members are 
much more experienced in group 
decision making. 	 Therefore, an 
important area for further research 
would be conducting longitudinal 
studies of real-world decision making 
groups. It would be interesting to 
follow the performance of groups and 
organizations using unanimity, 
majority, devil's advocacy, and 
dialectical inquiry. 
Valuable future research could 
also be done on groupthink and 
entrapment among real-world decision 
making groups. Research conducted 
in non-laboratory environments would 
be very important, but at the very least, 
it would be important that future 
research use management executives 
and others involved professionally 
indecision making in future laboratory 
experiences. 
It would also be important to 
compare the results of research using 
executives as subjects with those using 
MODERN PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES 
	
SPRING 1998 
students. If there is a high-correlation 
in the results, it could be argued that 
the student data is more readily 
generlizable than is possible to argue 
now. 
It would also be interesting to 
see further cross-cultural research on 
the use of decision rules. It would be 
interesting to see if the effects of 
decision rules vary from culture to 
culture. This would be important 
information 
	 to 	 multi-national 
corporations and multi-cultural 
organizations. 
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